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Abstract. Every finite noncooperative game can be presented as a weighted network 
congestion game, and also as a network congestion game with player-specific costs. In the 
first presentation, different players may contribute differently to congestion, and in the 
second, they are differently (negatively) affected by it. This paper shows that the topology of 
the underlying (undirected two-terminal) network provides information about the existence 
of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the game. For some networks, but not for others, every 
corresponding game has at least one such equilibrium. For the weighted presentation, a 
complete characterization of the networks with this property is given. The necessary and 
sufficient condition is that the network has at most three routes that do traverse any edge in 
opposite directions, or it consists of several such networks connected in series. The 
corresponding problem for player-specific costs remains open. Keywords: Congestion games, 
network topology, existence of equilibrium. 
1  Introduction 
An exact potential for a noncooperative game is a function ? on strategy profiles that exactly 
reflects the players’ incentives to change their strategies. Whenever a single player moves to 
a different strategy, his gain or loss is equal to the corresponding change in ?. In a game with 
a finite number of players and strategies, the existence of an exact potential implies that any 
improvement path, or chain of beneficial moves, must be finite: at some point, a (pure-
strategy Nash) equilibrium is reached. Monderer and Shapley [‎ 32] showed that a finite game 
admits an exact potential if and only if it can be presented as a congestion game [‎ 37]. In this 
presentation, the players share a finite set 𝐸 of resources, but may differ in which resources 
they are allowed to use. Specifically, each strategy of each player corresponds to a particular 
nonempty subset of 𝐸. The player’s payoff from using the strategy is equal to the negative of 
the total cost of using the corresponding resources. The cost of each resource depends only 
on its identity and the number of users. It does not necessarily increase with congestion, and 
it may be negative (and equal to the negative of the gain from using the resource). 
Restricting or expanding the meaning of ‘congestion game’ has a similar effect on the class 
of presentable finite games. A particularly natural restriction is increasing or (at least) 
nondecreasing cost functions: congestion never makes users better off. Two other possible 
restrictions are: singleton congestion games, where each strategy includes a single resource, 
and network congestion games, where resources are represented by edges in an undirected1 
graph and strategies correspond to routes, which are paths in the graph that connect the 
                                                            
1 Directionality is viewed here as a limitation on the allowed usage of the network, rather than as an intrinsic 
property. See [‎ 27, ‎ 28].   2 
player’s origin and destination vertices. (The former restriction is a special case of the latter. 
It corresponds to a parallel network, which is one with only two vertices.) Examples of 
extensions are congestion games with player-specific costs (or payoffs [‎ 25]), in which players 
are differently affected by congestion, and weighted congestion games, in which their 
contributions to it (the players’ “congestion impacts”) differ. Different subsets of these 
alterations correspond to games with qualitatively different properties. A singleton 
congestion game with player-specific costs does not necessarily have a (pure-strategy) 
equilibrium if congestion makes players better, rather than worse off [‎ 21, ‎ 26]. By contrast, in 
the diametrically opposite case of nondecreasing cost function (i.e., a crowding game), at 
least one equilibrium always exists, although infinite improvement paths are possible 
[‎ 25, ‎ 26]. The existence of equilibrium in a singleton congestion game with nondecreasing 
cost functions is guaranteed also if the players differ in their weights rather than cost 
functions, but not if they differ in both respects [‎ 25]. This is not the case for network 
congestion games (on non-parallel networks), which may have no equilibrium even if the 
players differ only in their weights [‎ 14, ‎ 23] or only in their cost functions [‎ 20] and have 
identical allowable routes.  
Libman and Orda [‎ 23] raised as an interesting subject for further research the problem of 
identifying all non-parallel networks for which the existence of equilibrium is guaranteed in 
all corresponding weighted congestion games. They added that series-parallel networks, 
which are built from single edges using only the operations of connecting networks in series 
or in parallel, may be especially interesting. For network congestion games with player-
specific costs, Konishi [‎ 20] noted the similarity between the topological conditions for the 
existence of equilibrium and those for the uniqueness of the equilibrium in similar 
nonatomic games with a continuum of non-identical players, each with an infinitesimal 
congestion impact. (The existence of equilibrium in such games is not an issue since it is 
guaranteed by weak assumptions on the cost functions [‎ 39].) Specifically, a parallel network 
is a sufficient condition in both cases. The problem that these authors point to is thus the 
identification of all networks with the topological (equilibrium) existence property for a 
particular variety of network congestion games, which means that every game of that kind 
on the network has at least one equilibrium.  
The topological existence property is particularly interesting for varieties of network 
congestion games which are capable of representing all finite games. As pointed out by 
Monderer [‎ 31], this is the case for network congestion games with player-specific costs. It is 
also the case for weighted network congestion games that are expanded to allow cost 
functions without self effect. In such games, the cost of a resource for a player may be a 
function of the total weight of the other users (see Section ‎ 2.3). For both kinds of network 
congestion games, it suffices to consider two-terminal (or single-commodity) networks, 
which have a single pair of origin and destination vertices where all players’ routes start and 
terminate, respectively. Since these two kinds of network congestion games can be used to 
present any finite game, they cannot possibly have any special properties. Their significance 
lies in the information the presentation provides about the presented game. In particular, an 
equilibrium exists in every finite game that can be presented as a network congestion game 
on a (two-terminal) network with the topological existence property. This paper presents the 
solution to the problem of identifying all two-terminal networks with the topological 3 
existence property for weighted network congestion games (expanded as indicated above). 
It also summarizes the known facts about the corresponding problem for network 
congestion games with player-specific costs and some additional related models.  
1.1  Other properties of games related to the network topology 
The topological equilibrium existence problem is substantially different from that of 
identifying classes of cost functions for which an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist. An 
example of such a class is linear (or affine) functions, that is, cost functions of the form 
?? + ?, with ?,? ≥ 0. An equilibrium exists in every weighted network congestion game 
with linear cost functions, regardless of the network topology [‎ 14]. Linearity of the cost 
functions moreover implies that the game has a weighted potential (which changes 
proportionally to each player’s gain or loss whenever only that player changes his strategy 
[‎ 32]), and this is the case also if the constant terms (the ?’s) are player-specific (as well as 
resource-specific) [‎ 24]. Similarly, for network congestion games with player-specific costs 
but identical weights, a sufficient condition for the existence of equilibrium is that the 
players’ (possibly, nonlinear) cost functions are identical up to additive (player- as well as 
resource-specific) constants [‎ 12, ‎ 21]. Indeed, such identity implies that the game has an 
exact potential. An immediate corollary of the last result is that every singleton congestion 
game with player-specific cost functions that are identical up to multiplicative constants (for 
example, linear cost functions without constant terms [‎ 16, ‎ 17]) has an equilibrium, and 
moreover has an ordinal potential (which changes in the same direction as the cost for of 
any single player who unilaterally changes his strategy [‎ 32]). Identity up to constants of the 
cost functions does not guarantee existence of equilibrium in singleton congestion games 
where the players differ also in their weights [‎ 30].  
A similar distinction between the influences of the network topology and of the functional 
form of the cost functions also applies to the questions of the price of anarchy, the Pareto 
efficiency of the equilibria and the uniqueness of the equilibrium costs. Some of the known 
results concerning these properties of the equilibria are described below. In this account, 
‘network congestion game’ without qualifiers refers to the lowest common denominator of 
identical players (that is, identical cost functions, weights and allowable routes, and in 
particular origin and destination vertices) and cost functions that are positive and increasing.  
The (pure) price of anarchy [‎ 22, ‎ 35] in a game refers to some measure of social cost such as 
the maximum over all used strategies or the total (i.e., aggregate) cost. It is defined as the 
ratio between the social cost at the worst (pure-strategy) equilibrium in the game and the 
cost at the social optimum. The price of anarchy for a class of games is defined as the 
supremum over all games in the class. For any two-terminal network, the price of anarchy 
with respect to the maximum cost for network congestion games with (identical players and) 
linear cost functions on the network does not exceed 5/2 [‎ 5]. For some networks, the price 
is lower. In particular [‎ 9], it is equal to 1 if and only if the network is an extension-parallel 
one [‎ 18], or a network with linearly independent routes [‎ 28], meaning that each 
(undirected) route has an edge that is not in any other route. The price of anarchy with 
respect to the total cost also depends on the network topology. It is 4/3 for the class of 
network congestion games with linear cost functions on networks with linearly independent 
routes, but higher even for series-parallel networks [‎ 13]. Interestingly, the network topology 4 
becomes essentially irrelevant for the price of anarchy with respect to the total cost (but not 
with respect to the maximum cost [‎ 9]) when the players’ allowable routes may differ. For 
network congestion games with linear cost functions and player-specific allowable routes, 
the price is 5/2 both for general networks and in the special case of parallel networks 
[‎ 3, ‎ 4, ‎ 5]. If the players may differ also in their weights, the price of anarchy with respect to 
the total cost rises to (3 +  5)/2 (≈ 2.618), but this again applies to both general and 
parallel networks [‎ 3, ‎ 4‎ ]. The irrelevance of the network topology also extends to nonatomic 
network congestion games, where, with linear cost functions and player-specific allowable 
routes, the price of anarchy with respect to the total cost is 4/3 [‎ 38]. This maximum is 
already achieved in a game on a parallel network with only two edges. Whether or not the 
network topology is relevant for the intermediate model of splittable flow, in which the 
number of players is finite but they can split their flow arbitrarily among multiple routes, 
seems to be unknown [‎ 6].  
An extension-parallel network is a necessary and sufficient condition also for weak Pareto 
efficiency of all equilibria in all (finite) network congestion games on the network, meaning 
that it is never possible to alter the players’ equilibrium route choices in a way that benefits 
them all [‎ 18].2 This result extends to games in which players may differ in their allowable 
routes, but have identical origin and destination vertices. It does not extent to games with 
player-specific costs, where inefficient equilibria may exist even with two-edge parallel 
networks. For nonatomic network congestion games, the network topology is relevant to 
efficiency both with identical and with player-specific costs. In both cases, a necessary and 
sufficient condition for weak Pareto efficiency of all equilibria in all such games on a two-
terminal network is that the routes in the network are linearly independent, which is 
essentially the same condition as in the finite, identical-costs case (except that linear 
independence refers to undirected routes) [‎ 28]. In a sense, inefficient equilibria only occur in 
three particular two-terminal networks, which are the minimal such networks without the 
property of linearly independent routes. Linear independence of the routes is also a 
necessary and sufficient condition for the non-occurrence of Braess’s paradox in all 
nonatomic network congestion games with player-specific costs on the network. For 
identical-costs games, this topological condition is replaced by the weaker condition of a 
series-parallel network [‎ 28].  
The problem of the topological uniqueness of the equilibrium costs is relevant only for 
nonatomic network congestion games with player-specific costs. (In a game with identical 
cost functions, the equilibrium costs are always unique, and with a finite number of players, 
it is virtually impossible to guarantee uniqueness.) The class of two-terminal networks with 
guaranteed uniqueness of the players’ equilibrium costs is characterized by five simple kinds 
of networks called the nearly parallel networks [‎ 27]. The complementary class of all two-
terminal networks for which multiple equilibrium costs are possible consists of all the 
networks in which one of four particular “forbidden” networks is embedded. Similar results 
hold for network congestion games with finitely many players in which flow is splittable [‎ 36].  
                                                            
2 An extension-parallel network moreover guarantees that all equilibria are strong [‎ 18]. This is because an 
equilibrium is strong if and only if the strategy choices of every subset of players constitute a weak Pareto 
efficient equilibrium in the subgame defined by fixing the strategies of the remaining players.  5 
Two additional issues related to the equilibrium existence problem in (finite) network 
congestion games are the efficient computation of equilibrium and the convergence to 
equilibrium of certain simple algorithms in which players sequentially choose best (or better) 
response strategies (see, e.g., [‎ 10, ‎ 11, ‎ 13, ‎ 19, ‎ 23, ‎ 25]). An example of such an algorithm is 
greedy best response: the players enter the game one after the other, and each new entrant 
chooses a best response to the strategies of the present players. This algorithm always 
reaches an equilibrium in an (unweighted) network congestion game on a two-terminal 
series-parallel network, but may fail for networks that are not series-parallel even though an 
equilibrium always exists [‎ 15]. For some additional results concerning complexity and 
convergence, see Section ‎ 4.  
2  Preliminaries 
2.1  Game theory 
A finite noncooperative game Γ has a finite number ? of players whose strategy sets are 
finite. A strategy profile ? = (?1,?2,…,??) in Γ, which specifies a strategy ?? to each player 
?, is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, or simply equilibrium, if none of the players can 
increase his payoff by unilaterally switching to another strategy.  
Two games Γ and Γ′ with identical sets of players are isomorphic [‎ 32] if for each player ? 
there is a one-to-one correspondence between ?’s strategy sets in Γ and Γ′, such that each 
strategy profile ? in Γ yields the same payoffs to the players as the corresponding strategy 
profile ?′ in Γ′. Essentially, isomorphic games are just alternative presentations of a single 
game.  
Two games Γ and Γ′ with identical sets of players and respective strategy sets are similar if 
for each player the difference between the payoffs in Γ and Γ′ can be expressed as a 
function of the other players’ strategies. Equivalently, the gain or loss for a player from 
unilaterally switching from one strategy to another is always the same in both games. 
Similarity implies, in particular, that the two games are best-response equivalent [‎ 32, ‎ 33], 
that is, a player’s strategy is a best response to the other players’ strategies in one game if 
and only if this is so in the other game. It follows that similar games have identical sets of 
equilibria.  
A game Γ is an exact potential game [‎ 32] if it is similar to some game Γ′ in which all players 
have the same payoff function. The players’ common payoff function in Γ′ is said to be an 
exact potential for Γ. Note that this concept is a cardinal one: an increasing transformation 
of payoffs does not generally transform an exact potential game into another such game. An 
ordinal generalization of exact potential is generalized ordinal potential [‎ 32], or simply 
potential, which is defined as a real-valued function over strategy profiles that strictly 
increases whenever a single player changes his strategy and increases his payoff as a result. 
Clearly, if a potential exists, then its (even “local”) maximum points are equilibria. However, 
the existence of a potential in a finite game implies more than the existence of equilibrium. 
It is equivalent to the finite improvement property: every improvement path (which is a finite 
sequence of strategy profiles where each profile differs from the preceding one only in the 6 
strategy of a single player, whose payoff increases as a result of the change) is finite. In other 
words, the game has no improvement cycles (which are finite improvement paths that start 
and terminate with the same profile). A potential does not necessarily exist in finite games 
that only posses the weaker finite best-(reply) improvement property. This property differs 
from the finite improvement property in only requiring finiteness of best-(reply) 
improvement paths (where each new strategy is a best response for the moving player, who 
could not gain more by choosing some other strategy instead) or equivalently nonexistence 
of best-improvement cycles.   
The superposition of a finite number ? of games with identical sets of players is the game 
with the same set of players in which each player has to choose one of his strategies in each 
of the ? games and the payoff is the sum of the resulting ? payoffs [‎ 34]. Thus, the ? games 
are played simultaneously but independently. Clearly, a strategy profile in the superposition 
of ? games is an equilibrium if and only if it induces (by projection) an equilibrium in each of 
the constituent ? games.  
2.2  Graph theory 
An undirected multigraph consists of a finite set of vertices and a finite set of edges. Each 
edge ? joins two distinct vertices, ? and ?, which are referred to as the end vertices of ?. 
Thus, loops are not allowed, but more than one edge can join two vertices. An edge ? and a 
vertex ? are incident with each other if ? is an end vertex of ?. A (simple) path of length ? is 
an alternating sequence of vertices and edges ?0?1?1 ⋯??−1????, beginning and ending 
with vertices, in which each edge is incident with the two vertices immediately preceding 
and following it and all the vertices (and necessarily all the edges) are distinct. If the first and 
last vertices are clear from the context, the path may be written more simply as ?1?2 ⋯??. 
Every path traverses each of its edges ? in a particular direction: from the end vertex that 
precedes ? in the path to the vertex that follows it.   
A two-terminal network, or simply network, 𝐺 is an undirected multigraph together with a 
distinguished ordered pair of (distinct) terminal vertices, the origin ? and the destination ?, 
such that each vertex and each edge belongs to at least one path in which the first vertex is 
? and the last vertex is ?. Any path with these first and last vertices will be called a route in 
𝐺. A route can itself be viewed as a network. Specifically, it is an example of a sub-network of 
𝐺, that is, a network that can be obtained from 𝐺 by deleting some of its edges and non-
terminal vertices.  
The sub-network relation is a special case of the following one. A network 𝐺 is embedded in 
the wide sense3 in a network 𝐺′ if the latter can be obtained from the former by applying the 
following operations any number of times in any order (see Figure 1):  
(a)  The subdivision of an edge: its replacement by two edges with a single common end 
vertex.  
(b)  The addition of a new edge joining two existing vertices. 
                                                            
3 This notion of embedding, which was introduced in [‎ 27], is more inclusive than that used in [‎ 28]. The latter only 
allows one kind of terminal division (see below), namely terminal extension. The difference between the two 
notions of embedding is roughly similar to that between a minor of a graph and a topological minor (see [‎ 7]).  7 
(c)  The subdivision of a terminal vertex: addition of a new edge ? that joins ? or ? with a 
new vertex ?, followed by the replacement of the former by the latter as the end 
vertex in two or more edges originally incident with the terminal vertex.  
Two networks are homeomorphic if they can be obtained from the same network by 
successive subdivision of edges. This relation represents a high degree of similarly between 
the networks: each can be obtained from the other by the insertion and removal of non-
terminal vertices of degree two (which are incident with only two edges). Two networks will 
be identified if (they are isomorphic in the sense that) there is a one-to-one correspondence 
between the two sets of vertices, and another such correspondence between the sets of 
edges, such that (i) the incidence relation is preserved and (ii) the origin and destination in 
one network are paired with the origin and destination, respectively, in the other network. 
Two networks 𝐺 and 𝐺′ may be connected in parallel if they have the same origin and the 
same destination but no other common vertices or edges, and in series if they have only one 
common vertex which is the destination in 𝐺 and the origin in 𝐺′. In both cases, the set of 
vertices and the set of edges in the resulting network are the unions of the corresponding 
sets in 𝐺 and 𝐺′, and the origin and destination are those in 𝐺 and 𝐺′, respectively (as well 
as in 𝐺′ and 𝐺, respectively, in the case of connection in parallel). The connection of an 
arbitrary number of networks in parallel or in series is defined recursively. Each of the 
connected networks is embedded in the wide sense in the network resulting from their 
connection.  
A parallel network is a network that only has one edge or is made of several single-edge 
networks connected in parallel. A network is nearly parallel [‎ 27] if (i) it has only one 
route or (ii) it is made of two single-route networks connected in parallel to which any 
number of edges with identical end vertices were added, and each edge subdivided any 
number of times. Thus, depending on whether at most one or more than one edge was 
added, a nearly parallel network is homeomorphic to one of those in Figure 3 or Figure 
5, respectively. 
 
Figure 1. Embedding. The left network is embedded in the wide sense in each of the other three, which are 
obtained from it by (a) subdividing an edge, (b) adding a new edge, and, finally, (c) subdividing the destination. 
(a)  (b)  (c) 
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Figure 2. Two-player weighted network congestion games (top) and their strategic (or normal) form (bottom). 
Dotted, dashed and solid edges are allowable to player 1, player 2 and both players, respectively. The 
allowable directions are indicated where needed. The players’ weights are ?󶋏 = ? and ?󶋐 = ?. All relevant 
costs other than those shown are zero.  
2.3  Network congestion games 
A weighted network congestion game on a (two-terminal4) network 𝐺 is a finite, ?-player 
game that is defined as follows. First, allowable direction and (possibly, empty) set of users 
are specified for each edge in 𝐺, such that (i) each edge is traversed in the allowed direction 
by at least one route and (ii) each player ? has at least one allowable route, that is, a route ? 
in 𝐺 that includes only edges that ? is allowed to use and traverses them in the allowed 
direction. The strategy set of each player ? is the collection ℛ? of his allowable routes. 
Second, a weight ?? > 0 is specified for each player ?, which represents the player’s 
congestion impact and is also assumed to be (weakly) connected with the cardinality of his 
strategy set: For all ? and ? with ?? > ??,  ℛ?  ≤  ℛ? .5 The total weight of the players whose 
chosen route includes an edge ?, which is denoted by ? ?, is the flow (or load) on ?. The cost 
of using ? for each player ?, which may be positive or negative, is affected by the flow. The 
effect may take several forms, as detailed below. For each player ?, the cost of an (allowable) 
route ? is the sum of the costs of its edges. The player’s payoff is the negative of the cost of 
his chosen route. 
In this paper, the cost of an edge ? for a player ? may or may not involve self effect.6 That is, 
it may be a function of the total weight of all the users of ?, which is the flow ? ?, or only of 
                                                            
4 The assumption of a single origin–destination pair may be viewed as a normalization. Any network congestion 
game on a multi-commodity network, which has multiple origin–destination pairs, may also be viewed as a game 
with a single such pair. In that game, each terminal vertex is incident with a single allowable edge for each player, 
which joins it with the player’s corresponding terminal vertex in the original game. 
5 The cardinality assumption is used only in the proof of Proposition 2. Whether or not it can be dispensed with I 
do not know. Doing so might strengthen some of the results presented below but weaken a little bit some of the 
others.  
6 The special, and more familiar, case of mandatory self effect it considered in Section ‎ 4.3.  
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the total weight of the other users, ? ? − ??. Specifically, each edge ? is associated with a pair 
of nondecreasing cost functions ??:(0,∞) → (−∞,∞) and ??:[0,∞) → (−∞,∞), such that 
its cost for each player ? is given by  
??(? ?) + ??(? ? − ??). 
Lack of self effect is inconsequential in the special case of an unweighted network 
congestion game, where all weights are 1. In such a game, ?? = 0 can be assumed without 
loss of generality. However, if players do differ in their weights, then a non-zero ?? may 
mean that the cost of ? is not the same for all players. An (unweighted) network congestion 
game with player-specific costs is a variant of the above model which extends this possibility 
by allowing the cost functions of different players to take arbitrarily different functional 
forms, but on the other hand, assumes that all weights are 1. In such a game, the cost of an 
edge ? for a player ? is ??
? ? ? , where ??
?:(0,∞) → (−∞,∞) is the corresponding 
nondecreasing cost function and (the flow) ? ? is the total number of players using ?.  
2.4  Presentation theorem 
The definitions of network congestion games involve rather specific structures. However, it 
turns out that the games themselves have no special properties. In fact, as the following 
theorem shows, every finite game can be presented as a weighted network congestion game 
and as a network congestion game with player-specific costs. Thus, the presentation only 
has to involve players that differ in their weights or players that differ in their cost functions. 
The existence of a presentation of the latter kind for every finite game was first pointed out 
by Monderer [‎ 31].  
Theorem 1. Every finite game Γ is isomorphic both to a weighted network congestion game 
Γ′ and to a network congestion game with player-specific costs Γ″.   
Proof. Suppose that the number ? of players in Γ and the cardinality ? of the largest 
strategy set are both at least two (otherwise the assertion is trivial), and that, for 1 ≤ ? <
? ≤ ?, player ?’s number of strategies ?(?) is not greater than that of ? (otherwise take 
‘player 1’, ‘player 2’, … below to mean the player with the smallest number of strategies, the 
second-smallest number, and so on). Index the strategies of each player ? from 1 to ?(?). 
The indexing identifies each strategy profile with an element of 𝑀?, where 𝑀 = {1,2,…,?}. 
Order all elements of 𝑀? in the following way:  
 1,1,…,1 , 2,2,…,2 ,…, ?,?,…,? ,…, 1,2,…,2 , 2,3,…,3 ,…, ?,1,…,1 , 
where the order of the ?? − 2? elements represented by in the middle ellipsis mark is 
arbitrary. With each element ? =  ?1,?2,…,??  of 𝑀? (which may or may not represent an 
actual strategy profile – the latter holds if ?? > ?(?) for some player ?) associate two 
vertices ?? and ?? and an edge ?? joining them. The edge will be directed from ?? to ?? and 
be allowable to all players. Next, for each player ? and integer 1 ≤ ? ≤ ?(?), consider all 
? ∈ 𝑀? with ?? = ? and list them according to their order in (1). For each pair ? and ? of 
successive entries in this list, add an edge that joins ?? and ??, is directed from ?? to ?? and 
is allowable to player ? only. Finally, identify all vertices of the form ??, where ? is one of the 
first ? elements in (1), and denote this single vertex by ?. Do the same for all vertices of the 
(1) 10 
form ??, where ? is one of the last ? elements in (1), and denote the result by ?. These 
terminal vertices, together with the other vertices and edges specified above, constitute a 
network 𝐺 (see the example in Figure 2(b)), in which each allowable route ? for each player ? 
corresponds to some strategy ?? of ?. Specifically, ? includes all ??−1 edges ?? with ?? = ??, 
alternating with ??−1 − 1 edges that are allowable to player ? only. Different allowable 
routes to a player have no shared edges, and their only shared vertices are the terminal 
ones. 
To complete the definitions of the weighted network congestion game Γ′ and the network 
congestion game with player-specific costs Γ″, which are both defined on 𝐺, it remains to 
specify the weights in the former and the cost functions in both games. The weight of player 
? (= 1,2,…,?) is ?? = 2? − ? − 1. These weights guarantee that every set of ? − 1 players 
has a greater total weight than every set of ? − 2 or fewer players. The former is equal to 
 3? − 1 (0.5? − 1) + ?, where ? is the unique player not in the set, and the latter is at most 
 3? − 1 (0.5? − 1). The cost functions in Γ′ will be defined as follows. For each edge in 𝐺 of 
the form ??, with ? ∈ 𝑀? that is an actual strategy profile in Γ, ??? is identically zero and ??? 
is any nondencreasing function with 
??? ?  = 0,                                                                   ? ≤  3? − 1 (0.5? − 1) 
???  3? − 1 (0.5? − 1) + ?  = ?𝐾 − ℎ? ? , ? = 1,2,…,?, 
where 𝐾 is some number that is large enough to make ??? monotonic and ℎ? is player ?’s 
payoff function in Γ. For ? ∈ 𝑀? that is not an actual strategy profile, both ??? and ??? are 
identically zero. To offset the term ?𝐾 in (2), all edges ? that are allowable only to player ? 
will have the same, constant cost functions ?? = 0 and ?? = −?𝐾/( ??−1 − 1 ). As 
explained above, strategy profiles in Γ are in a one-to-one correspondence with allowable 
route choices in 𝐺. The routes that correspond to a strategy profile ? are such that exactly 
one edge, namely ??, is used by all ? players. Therefore, for each player ?, only ?? and edges 
that are allowable only to ? make a nonzero contribution to the player’s cost, which by (2) is 
equal to −ℎ? ? . The player’s payoff, which is ℎ? ? , is therefore the same as that in Γ. 
The definition of Γ″ is similar, but simpler. For each strategy profile ?,  
???
?  ?  = 0,                        ? ≤ ? − 1 
???
?  ?  = 𝐾 − ℎ? ? , ? = 1,2,…,?, 
where 𝐾 is some sufficiently large number and ℎ? is player ?’s payoff function in Γ. For each 
edge ? allowable only to one player ?, ??
? = −𝐾/( ??−1 − 1 ).  ∎  
A finite game Γ obviously has as more than a single pair of presentations as in Theorem 1. 
The “canonical” games Γ′ and Γ″ constructed in the proof, which share the same network 𝐺, 
are just one such pair. Other presentations may be preferable in that certain properties of Γ 
are more easily inferable from them. An example of such an alternative presentation is 
shown in Figure 2(a). The 2 × 2 game in that example is presented as a weighted network 
congestion game on a particular five-edge network, the Wheatstone network. This is not the 
network 𝐺 constructed in the proof of Theorem 1, which, for all 2 × 2 games, is the network 
in Figure 2(b). It can be immediately seen that the 2 × 2 game in (a) has two equilibria. 
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However, the existence of equilibrium in that game could be inferred without knowing the 
payoff matrices, the fact that the game is (essentially) symmetric, or even the number of 
players. As the next section shows, an equilibrium exists in any finite game that can be 
presented as a weighted network congestion game on the Wheatstone network. This is not 
the case for the network in Figure 2(b) (on which all 2 × 2 games are representable). 
3  The Topological Existence Property 
A network 𝐺 has the topological (equilibrium) existence property for weighted network 
congestion games or for network congestion games with player-specific costs if every game 
of the specified kind on 𝐺 has at least one (pure-strategy Nash) equilibrium. In view of 
Theorem 1, this means that every finite game that can be presented as such a network 
congestion game is guaranteed to have an equilibrium.  
A sufficient condition for a network 𝐺 to have the topological existence property for a 
particular kind of network congestion games is that 𝐺 is embedded in the wide sense in a 
network that has that property. This is because any game on 𝐺 that does not have an 
equilibrium can be “extended” to a game without an equilibrium on any network that is 
obtained from 𝐺 by applying any of the three operations that define embedding in the wide 
sense (Figure 1). For example, the operation of adding a new edge can be made 
inconsequential by not allowing any player to use the edge, and the edge ? that is created by 
terminal subdivision should be allowable with zero cost to all players.  
Another sufficient condition for the topological existence property is that the network 𝐺 is 
made of several networks with that property that are connected in series. The reason these 
networks bestow the topological existence property on 𝐺 is that, as the proof of the 
following proposition shows, any network congestion game on 𝐺 is the superposition (see 
Section ‎ 2.1) of such games on them.  
Proposition 1. A two-terminal network made of two or more networks connected in series 
has the topological existence property if and only if each of the constituent networks has 
that property. 
Proof. Let 𝐺 be a network made of ? (≥ 2) networks, 𝐺1,𝐺2,…,𝐺?, connected in series. For 
each player, choosing an allowable route ? in 𝐺 is equivalent to choosing ? allowable routes 
?1,?2,…,? ? in 𝐺1,𝐺2,…,𝐺?, respectively, and connecting them is series. Therefore, every 
weighted network congestion game Γ on 𝐺 can be presented as the superposition of ? such 
games – one on each constituent network – and the same is true for a network congestion 
game with player-specific costs. In each of the ? games, the players and their weights, as 
well as the cost functions and the allowable direction and players for each edge, are as in Γ. 
This proves that if for ? = 1,2,…,? every weighted network congestion game on 𝐺? has an 
equilibrium, or this is so for every network congestion game with player-specific costs, then 
𝐺 also has the same property.  
Conversely, if there is a weighted network congestion game without an equilibrium on 𝐺?, 
for some 1 ≤ ? ≤ ?, or there is some such network congestion game with player-specific 
costs, then a game with similar properties exists on 𝐺. For example, the superposition of the 12 
game on 𝐺? and games with zero costs on the other ? − 1 networks is (isomorphic to) a 
game on 𝐺 that does not have an equilibrium.  ∎ 
The rest of this section is concerned with weighted network congestion games, for which a 
complete characterization of the networks with the topological existence property is given. 
3.1  Networks with the topological existence property 
The simplest kind of network with the topological existence property for weighted network 
congestion games is a parallel network with no more than three edges (Figure 3(a)).  
Proposition 2. Every weighted network congestion game Γ on a parallel network 𝐺 with 
three or fewer edges has an equilibrium. 
Proof. Assume, without loss of generality, that 𝐺 has precisely three edges (some of which 
may not be allowable to any player), and hence three routes. Identify the edges with three 
points on an imaginary cycle, and say that edge ? follows (precedes) edge ?′ if the latter is 
the first edge encountered with when moving along the cycle from ? in the clockwise 
(respectively, counterclockwise) direction. The first part of the proof establishes the 
existence of an equilibrium under the additional assumption that no player has more than 
two allowable edges. The second part covers the general case. Both parts use the following 
simple result. 
Claim 1. Let ? and ?′ be two edges in 𝐺 that are allowable to two players ? and ?. If both 
players use ?, but only ? would benefit from unilaterally moving to ?′, then ?? < ??. 
The premise in Claim 1 means that the flows on ? and ?′ are such that  
 ??′ ??′ + ??  + ??′ ??′   −  ?? ? ?  + ?? ? ? − ??   < 0
≤  ??′ ??′ + ??  + ??′ ??′   −  ?? ? ?  + ?? ? ? − ??  . 
The conclusion follows from the monotonicity of the cost functions ??′ and ??.  
First part of the proof. Suppose that no player is allowed to use all edges. Associate with 
each strategy profile (which assigns an edge in 𝐺 to each player) the total weight ?   of the 
players whose edge follows another allowable edge. There is obviously a unique strategy 
with ?   = 0, which trivially satisfies the following: 
Each of the players is either not allowed to or would not benefit from moving from 
his edge to the preceding edge.  
Since ?   cannot be greater than the total weight of the players, to prove that an equilibrium 
exists it suffices to establish the following.  
Claim 2. For every strategy profile satisfying ? that is not an equilibrium, there is another 
strategy profile satisfying ? with a higher ?  .  
To prove Claim 2, consider a strategy profile satisfying ? such that the cost to some player ? 
can be reduced by moving ? to some (allowable) edge ?, which is necessarily the one 
following ?’s edge ?′. Such a move creates a strategy profile with a lower flow on ?′ and a 
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higher flow on ?. That strategy profile may or may not have property ?. However, due to the 
monotonicity of the costs, ? does not hold only if for one or more of the players using ? 
moving to (the preceding) edge ?′ is both allowed and beneficial. In that case, move the 
highest-weight such player from ? to ?′, and repeat doing that until no more players can 
benefit from that move. Necessarily, player ? is not one of the movers. Indeed, ?’s incentive 
to return to ?′ can only get lower with each move, and therefore Claim 1 implies that 
?? < ?? for each of the movers ?. Thus, the strategy profile reached after the last move 
differs from the original one in that player ? uses ? rather than ?′, and the opposite is true 
for some (possibly, empty) set of other players. The total weight ?′ of the players in that set 
must satisfy ?′ < ??. Otherwise, for each of these players ?, the monotonicity of the cost 
functions and the fact that ?? < ?? would imply the following inequality: 
 ??′ ??′  + ??′ ??′ − ??   −  ?? ? ? + ??  + ?? ? ?  
≥  ??′ ??′ − ?′ + ??  + ??′ ??′ − ?′  
−  ?? ? ? + ?′  + ?? ? ? + ?′ − ??  . 
However, the left-hand side is (strictly) negative at least for the player ? who was the last to 
move from ? to ?′ (otherwise the move would not have benefited him), while the right-hand 
side is (strictly) positive since it gives the reduction in the cost to ? when he moved from ?′ 
to ?. This shows that the above inequality, and hence also ?′ ≥ ??, actually cannot hold.  
The result that ?? − ?′ is positive means that ? ? is higher, and ??′ is lower, than the 
respective flows in the original strategy profile. Therefore, there are still no players who 
would gain from moving to ? from the third edge in 𝐺 or from moving to that edge from ?′. 
Hence, ? holds for both the original and the new strategy profiles. In the latter, the total 
weight ?   of the players whose edge follows another allowable edge is higher by ?? − ?′ 
than in the former. This completes the proof of Claim 2. 
Second part of the proof. Suppose that Γ has some players ? with three allowable edges, 
possibly in addition to players ? with only one or two. Re-index the players in the game in 
such a way that, for some ? ≥ 1, the inequalities ? < ? ≤ ? hold for all players ? and ? as 
above, who differ in their number of strategies, and ?? ≥ ?? holds for all ? and ? with ? < ?. 
(The cardinality assumption in the definition of network congestion game implies that such 
re-indexing is possible.) For each player ?, define Γ? as the game obtained from Γ by “taking 
out” ? and all the higher-index players, so that these players do not choose routes and do 
not contribute to the flows. For example, Γ? is the game in which only the players in Γ with 
one or two allowable edges participate. This game may actually have no players. 
It follows from the first part of the proof that Γ? has an equilibrium. To prove that an 
equilibrium exists also in every Γ? with ? > ? (and hence in Γ), it suffices to show that, for 
every such ?, the existence of an equilibrium in Γ?−1 implies the same for Γ?. In fact, for any 
equilibrium in Γ?−1, simply choosing a best response strategy for player ? gives an 
equilibrium in Γ?. Clearly, any player ? whose edge is different from the edge ? chosen by ? 
still cannot gain from changing his strategy. (His incentive to do so is, if anything, even lower 
than before.) The same is true if ?’s strategy is ?. Since ?? ≥ ??, and since moving from ? to 
another edge ?′ is not beneficial to ?, it follows from Claim 1 that the same applies to ?.  ∎ 14 
 
Figure 3. Two-terminal networks with the topological existence property. Every weighted network congestion 
game on any of these networks has a (pure-strategy Nash) equilibrium. The two gray curves in the parallel 
network (a) are optional edges.  
By Propositions 1 and 2, any network that can be constructed by connecting in series two or 
more parallel networks as in Figure 3(a) (for example, the figure-eight network) has the 
topological existence property. The next proposition shows that the property also holds for 
the networks in Figure 3(b)–(e), which cannot be constructed in this way. Indeed, the 
Wheatstone network (Figure 3(e)) is not even series-parallel, meaning that it cannot be 
constructed from networks with single edges by any sequence of operations of connecting 
networks in series or in parallel.  
Proposition 3. Every weighted network congestion game Γ on any of the networks in Figure 
3 has an equilibrium. 
This result is an immediate corollary of Proposition 2 and the following lemma. The lemma 
shows that every network congestion game Γ as in Proposition 3 is similar (see Section ‎ 2.1) 
to a game on a particular parallel network. That game is obtained from Γ by a procedure 
(“parallelization”) that involves transformation of some cost functions with self effect (??’s) 
into cost functions without self effect (??’s) and vice versa. This suggests that the two forms 
are intimately connected. 
Lemma 1. Every weighted network congestion game Γ on any of the networks 𝐺 in Figure 3 
is similar to such a game Γ   on a parallel network with three edges. 
Proof. Suppose that 𝐺 is one of the networks in Figure 3(b)–(e). (For (a), the assertion is 
trivial.) Let 𝐺   be the parallel network obtained from 𝐺 by contracting [‎ 7] edges ?′ and ?″ (or 
only the former, if 𝐺 has only four edges), that is, performing the (one-sided) inverse of 
terminal subdivision (Figure 1(c)), which eliminates the edge and its non-terminal vertex. 
Each of the three routes in 𝐺   corresponds to a route in 𝐺, in that the former’s single edge is 
the unique edge in the latter that did not undergo contraction. This correspondence 
between routes is one-to-one and onto, with one exception. The single exception is route 
?4?1?3 in the Wheatstone network (e), which does not have a corresponding route in the 
parallel network. The omission of that route is inconsequential since, by symmetry, it 
suffices to consider network congestion games on the Wheatstone network in which the 
allowable direction of ?1 is from ? to ?. Thus, it suffices to consider weighted network 
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congestion games Γ on 𝐺 in which every route ? that is allowable for some player includes a 
unique edge that also belongs to the corresponding parallel network 𝐺  . The next step is to 
describe the corresponding weighted network congestion game Γ   on 𝐺  . 
The following description concerns the case in which 𝐺 is the Wheatstone network (e), so 
that 𝐺   is the parallel network with edges ?1, ?3 and ?4. The other three cases ((b)–(d)) are 
similar (actually, simpler). The game Γ   on 𝐺   inherits its set of players, their weights and the 
strategy sets from the game Γ on 𝐺 (with the identification of routes in 𝐺 and 𝐺   described 
above). The cost functions in Γ   (which are marked by a tilde) are derived from those in Γ 
(without a tilde) as follows. For 0 ≤ ? < ? ≤ ?, where ? =   ??
?  is the players’ total 
weight,  
? ?1 ?  = ??1 ? ,                                    ?  ?1 ?  = ??1 ? , 
? ?3 ?  = ??3 ?  − ??″  ? − ? , ?  ?3 ?  = ??3 ?  − ??″  ? − ? , 
? ?4 ?  = ??4 ?  − ??′ ? − ? , ?  ?4 ?  = ??4 ?  − ??′ ? − ? . 
It remains to show that the games Γ and Γ   are similar. That is, for every player ?, the 
difference between the costs to ? in Γ and Γ   can be expressed as a function of the route 
choices of the other players. If ?’s route includes ?1 (and, thus, does not include ?3 or ?4), the 
difference can be written as  
??′(?4
−? + ??) + ??′(?4
−?) + ??″ (?3
−? + ??) + ??″ (?3
−?), 
where ??
−? is the total weight of the players other than ? whose route does not include ??. 
The same expression gives the difference between the costs in Γ and Γ   also if ?’s route ? 
does include either ?3 or ?4. For example, if ? includes (only) the former, the difference is  
 ??′ ? − ? ?4  + ??′ ? − ? ?4 − ??  + ??3(? ?3) + ??3(? ?3 − ??) 
−  ? ?3(? ?3) + ?  ?3(? ?3 − ??) , 
which equals (3). Thus, the difference is independent of ?’s route, as had to be shown.  ∎ 
Parenthetically, the assertion of Lemma 1 cannot be strengthened to isomorphism between 
Γ and Γ  . In other words, the class of weighted network congestion games on the networks in 
Figure 3 and the subclass obtained by only considering the parallel networks shown in (a) are 
not equal. For example, it is not difficult to see that the 2 × 2 game in Figure 2(a) cannot be 
presented as a weighted network congestion game on any parallel network. 
3.2  Networks without the topological existence property 
A network without the topological existence property can be obtained from a network 
homeomorphic to one of those in Figure 3 (with that proviso that the two optional edges in 
(a) actually exist) simply by the addition of a single edge (with existing end vertices). Any 
such addition will have that effect. This is because the resulting network necessarily has one 
or more of those in Figure 4 embedded in it in the wide sense. As the proof of the following 
proposition shows, there are three-player games on the networks in Figure 4(b)–(e) and a 
four-player game on the four-edge parallel network (a) which do not have an equilibrium. It 
can be shown that these numbers of players are minimal for non-existence of equilibrium. In 
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particular, every weighted network congestion game with three or fewer players on any 
parallel network has an equilibrium.  
Proposition 4. A weighted network congestion game without an equilibrium exists on each 
of the networks in Figure 4. 
Proof. The proof comprises the following four examples.  
Example 1. Four players, with weights ?1 = 1, ?2 = 2 and ?3 = ?4 = 3, choose routes in 
the network in Figure 4(a). Each player has two allowable routes: “left”, which for player 1, 
2, 3 and 4 means ?2, ?2, ?1 and ?3, respectively, and “right”, which means ?3, ?4, ?2 and ?4, 
respectively. Edge ?1 has the constant cost ??1 = 16. The other edges have variable costs, 
with ??2 1  = 2,??2 3  = 3,??2 4  = 15,??2 5  = 17;??3 1  = 4,??3 3  = 10,??3 4  = 14 
and ??4 2  = 2,??4 3  = 11,??4 5  = 12. In addition, ?? = 0 for all edges ? except ?4, for 
which ??4 0  = 0,??4 2  = 1 and ??4 3  = 6. It can be verified that “left” is the better 
choice for player 3, player 1 or player 4 if and only if the strategy of player 2, player 3 or 
player 1, respectively, is also “left”. Therefore, in any equilibrium where player 2 plays “left” 
or “right”, the other players necessarily do the same. However, this means that in the former 
case player 2 can decrease his cost from 3 to 2 by (unilaterally) changing his choice to 
“right”, and in the latter case, he can decrease it from 18 to 17 by changing to “left”. This 
proves that an equilibrium does not exist. 
Example 2. Three players, with weights ?1 = 3 and ?2 = ?3 = 4, choose routes in the 
network in Figure 4(b) or in that in (c). The only restrictions on route choices are that edge 
?2 is only allowable to player 2, who is not allowed to use ?1, and ?3 is only allowable to 
player 3, who is not allowed to use ?4. Thus, there are two allowable routes for each player: 
“left”, which includes ?5, and “right”, which does not. The two “private” edges have constant 
costs: ??2 = 7 and ??3 = 13. The other edges have variable costs: ??1 ?  = ?, ??4 ?  =
0.75 0.25? − 2 9 + 15 and ??5 ?  = ?. For all edges ?, ?? = 0. It can be verified that “left” 
is the better choice for player 1, player 2 or player 3 if and only if the strategy of player 2, 
player 3 or player 1, respectively, is “right”. It follows that an equilibrium does not exist. 
 
Figure 4. Networks without the topological existence property. On each of these networks there is a weighted 
network congestion game that does not have a (pure-strategy Nash) equilibrium.  
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Example 3. Three players, with weights ?1 = 1 and ?2 = ?3 = 2, choose routes in the 
network in Figure 4(d). The only restrictions are that edge ?2 is only allowable to player 2, 
who is not allowed to use ?1, and ?3 is only allowable to player 3, who is not allowed to use 
?4. Thus, there are two allowable routes to each player: “left”, which does not include ?5, 
and “left”, which does. The two “private” edges have constant costs: ??2 = 3 and ??3 = 9. 
The other edges have variable costs, with ??1 1  = 1,??1 2  = 2,??1 3  = 8;??4 1  =
2,??4 2  = 10,??4 3  = 12 and ??5 ?  = 4?. For all edges ?, ?? = 0. It can be verified that 
“left” is the better choice for player 1, player 2 or player 3 if and only if the strategy of player 
2, player 3 or player 1, respectively, is “right”. It follows that an equilibrium does not exist. 
Example 4. Three players, with weights ?1 = 1, ?2 = 5 and ?3 = 10, choose routes in the 
network in Figure 4(e). The only restrictions are that edge ?2 is only allowable to player 2, 
who is not allowed to use ?1, and ?3 is only allowable to player 3, who is not allowed to use 
?4. Thus, there are two allowable routes to each player: “left”, which does not include ?5, 
and “left”, which does. Three of the edges have constant costs, ??2 = 1.3, ??3 = 6.25 and 
??5 = 40, and three have variable costs, ??1 ?  = 2?,??4 ?  = 5? and ??6 ?  = 3.55 ?. For 
all edges ?, ?? = 0. It can be verified that “left” is the better choice for player 1, player 2 or 
player 3 if and only if the strategy of player 2, player 3 or player 1, respectively, is “right”. It 
follows that an equilibrium does not exist. 
Another example of a game without an equilibrium on the network in Figure 4(e) can be 
obtained from Example 3 by simply setting ??6 = 0.  ∎ 
3.3  Characterization 
The main result in this section is that, for weighted network congestion games, the networks 
in Figure 3 and Figure 4 are in a sense the only networks with and without the topological 
existence property, respectively. It is based on a graph theoretic result [‎ 27, Proposition 2.1], 
which identifies one or more of the networks in these figures in every two-terminal network.  
Lemma 2. For a two-terminal network 𝐺, the following conditions are equivalent: 
(i)  𝐺 is homeomorphic to one of the networks in Figure 3, or to a network made of several 
such networks connected in series. 
(ii)  None of the networks in Figure 4 is embedded in the wide sense in 𝐺. 
(iii) 𝐺 has the topological existence property. 
Proof. Networks homeomorphic to one of those presented in Figure 3 are a special case of 
nearly parallel networks (see Section ‎ 2.2). They differ from the other nearly parallel 
networks, which are homeomorphic to one of those shown in Figure 5, in that the four-edge 
parallel network (Figure 4(a)) is not embedded in them in the wide sense. The networks in 
Figure 4(b)–(e) are not nearly parallel. They are called the forbidden networks in [‎ 27], where 
it is proved that one, and only one, of the following two conditions holds for every two-
terminal network 𝐺: 
(i')  𝐺 is nearly parallel, or it consists of two or more nearly parallel networks connected 
in series. 
(ii') One or more of the forbidden networks is embedded in the wide sense in 𝐺. 18 
If a network 𝐺 satisfies (ii') but not (i'), then it does not satisfy (i) or (ii). It hence follows from 
Proposition 4 that 𝐺 also does not satisfy (iii). If 𝐺 satisfies (i') but not (ii'), there are two 
cases to consider. If (i) does not hold, then (since (i') does hold) the network in Figure 4(a) is 
embedded in the wide sense in 𝐺. Hence, (ii) does not hold and, by Example 1, the same is 
true for (iii). If (i) does hold, then it follows from Propositions 1 and 3 that (iii) also holds, 
which by Proposition 4 implies the same for (ii). This completes the proof of the equivalence 
of conditions (i), (ii) and (iii): either all of them hold, or none of them holds.  ∎ 
An additional, strikingly simple characterization of networks with the topological existence 
property follows as an immediate corollary from the following observation. The four or five 
routes in each of the networks in Figure 4 have the property that no two routes pass through 
any edge in opposite directions. Each of the operations that define embedding in the wide 
sense can obviously only increase the number of routes with that property or leave it 
unchanged. By contrast, the maximum number of such routes in each of the networks in 
Figure 3 is three. In view of Lemma 2, this implies that, to tell whether a given network 𝐺 has 
the topological existence property, is suffices to record the maximum number of routes as 
above in the networks 𝐺 is made of, in the sense of connection of networks in series. This 
proves the following. 
Theorem 2. For a two-terminal network 𝐺 that is not made of two or more such networks 
connected in series, a weighted network congestion game without an equilibrium exists on 
𝐺 if and only if there are four routes in the network such that no two routes pass through 
any edge in opposite directions. 
It follows from Theorem 2 that there is, for example, a weighted network congestion game 
on the (underlying undirected) network in Figure 2(b) that does not have an equilibrium. This 
is of course also an immediate corollary of the result that every 2 × 2 game can be 
presented as such a weighted network congestion game (see the proof of Theorem 1).  
One may wonder whether the non-existence in of four routes as in Theorem 2 in a network 
actually guarantees more than just the existence of equilibrium, that is, whether there are 
any stronger properties that are common to all weighted network congestion games on such 
networks. One such property might be the existence of a (generalized ordinal) potential (see 
Section ‎ 2.1). However, as the following example shows, this property is in fact not 
guaranteed. Even in a three-player game on a three-edge parallel network, improvement 
(and even best-improvement) cycles may exist. Although such a game always has an 
equilibrium, a specific order of moves may be required to get there.  
Example 5. Three players, with weights ?1 = ?2 = 1 and ?3 = 2, choose routes in the 
parallel network with edges ?1,?2,?3. Each player ? can use all edges except ??. The cost 
functions are: ??1 ?  = 16.75 − 9/?,??2 ?  = 3? + 6,??3 ?  = 8?,??1 ?  = ?2,??2 ?  =
??3 ?  = 0. It can be verified that, starting with the strategy profile in which players 1 and 2 
use ?3 and player 3 uses ?2, the following is a (best-) improvement cycle: player 1 moves to 
?2, player 2 moves to ?1, player 3 moves to ?1, player 1 moves to ?3, player 2 moves to ?3, 
and player 3 moves to ?2, thus completing the cycle. Note that an equilibrium would be 
(immediately) reached if player 2 (rather than 1) moved first (to ?1), and a different 
equilibrium would be reached if player 3 (rather than 2) moved second (to ?1).  19 
 
Figure 5. The parallel network (a) has the topological existence property for weighted network congestion 
games with mandatory self effect. The networks (b)–(e) do not have that property. Gray ellipsis mark and 
curve represent (any number of) optional edges. 
4  Related Models and Open Problems  
4.1  Player-specific costs 
The topological existence property for network congestion games with player-specific costs 
is not equivalent to the corresponding property for weighted network congestion games 
(Section ‎ 3). Specifically, the former is less demanding: it holds not only for the networks 𝐺 
that satisfy condition (i) (or (ii)) in lemma 2 but also for certain other networks. In particular, 
an equilibrium exists in every network congestion games with player-specific costs on any 
parallel network, regardless of the number of edges [‎ 25]. By a parallelization argument 
similar to that in Lemma 1 it follows that the topological existence property actually holds 
for all nearly parallel networks that are homeomorphic to one of those in Figure 5 (a)–(d) 
[‎ 29].7  
The main open problem regarding the topological existence property for network congestion 
games with player-specific costs is whether, and to what extent, the property holds for 
networks that are not nearly parallel or made of several nearly parallel networks connected 
in series. In particular, it is not known whether the forbidden networks (Figure 4(b)–(e)) have 
this property. A partial result is that each of the following single-edge additions gives a 
network without the topological existence property [‎ 29]: an edge with end vertices ? and ? 
in Figure 4(b) (equivalently, ? and ? in (c) or ? and ? in (d)), end vertices ? and ? in Figure 
4(e), or end vertices ? and ? in the Wheatstone network (Figure 3(e)).  
From a computational complexity point of view, finding an equilibrium in a network 
congestion game with player-specific costs on a parallel network (that is, a singleton 
congestion game), and hence also in such a game on each of the nearly parallel networks 
mentioned above, is not difficult. Starting with any strategy profile, there is a best-
                                                            
7 The parallelization argument partially applies also to the remaining nearly parallel networks, which are those 
homeomorphic to a network as in Figure 5(e) [‎ 29]. The limitation is that the argument only applies to games in 
which all the allowable routes that include both ? and ? pass these vertices in the same order: either ? first or ? 
first. 
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improvement path that ends at an equilibrium, with a length that is polynomial in the 
number of players and strategies [‎ 25]. For a network congestion game with player-specific 
costs on a general network, it may be computationally difficult to determine whether an 
equilibrium exists. Ackermann and Skopalik [‎ 1] showed that this problem is in fact NP-
complete even with only two players. 
4.2  Resource-symmetric games 
In a resource-symmetric (often referred to simply as “symmetric”) weighted network 
congestion game, all players share the same set of allowable edges, which without loss of 
generality may be assumed to include all edges. The topological existence property for such 
games is less demanding than in the general case considered in Section ‎ 3. In particular, it 
holds for all parallel networks. This can easily be proved constructively by employing the 
greedy best response algorithm [‎ 15] used in the second part of the proof of Proposition 2, 
that is, by letting the players enter the game one by one with heavier players entering first. 
As is the case for network congestion games with player-specific costs (Section ‎ 4.1), a 
parallelization argument extends this result to the nearly parallel networks in Figure 5(b)–(d) 
(and partially to (e); see footnote 7) [‎ 29]. However, whether every network that has the 
topological existence property for network congestion games with player-specific costs also 
has that property for resource-symmetric weighted network congestion games, or vice 
versa, is an open problem. For some of the examples (in Section ‎ 4.1) of networks without 
the first property, it is not known whether or not the second property holds, and for other 
networks, the reverse is true. An example of the latter is the network with linearly 
independent routes that is obtained from that in Figure 4(c) by subdividing ?1 and joining 
the resulting new vertex with ? by a new edge. A resource-symmetric weighted network 
congestion games on this network that does not have an equilibrium is presented in [‎ 29]. 
4.3  Mandatory self effect 
Another natural subclass of weighted network congestion games is obtained by mandating 
self effect: ?? must be identically zero for all edges ?. Like resource symmetry, mandatory 
self effect adds to the set of networks with the topological existence property all parallel 
networks with more than three edges (Figure 5(a)). However, unlike resource symmetry, it 
adds essentially only these networks.  
The reason why restriction to cost functions with self effect guarantees the existence of 
equilibrium in every weighted network congestion game on a parallel network is that it 
entails that the cost of an edge is the same for every player who is allowed to use it. This 
equality implies that the game has a (generalized ordinal) potential [‎ 10, ‎ 11]. The reason why 
that restriction does not extend the topological existence property to other nearly parallel 
networks with more than three routes is that games that satisfy the restriction but do not 
have an equilibrium exist on each of the networks in Figure 5(b)–(e). The game presented in 
the following example is very similar to that in Example 1. In fact, the latter can be obtained 
from the former by parallelization (see the proof of Lemma 1).  
Example 6. Four players, with weights ?1 = 1, ?2 = 2 and ?3 = ?4 = 3, choose routes in 
one of the networks in Figure 5(b)–(e). Each player has two allowable routes, each of which 
includes exactly one of the edges ?1, ?2, ?3 and ?4. The “left” route for player 1, 2, 3 and 4 21 
includes ?2, ?2, ?1 and ?3, respectively, and the “right” route includes ?3, ?4, ?2 and ?4, 
respectively. Edge ?1 has the constant cost ??1 = 16. Edges ?2, ?3, ?4 and ?′ have variable 
costs, with ??2 1  = 2,??2 3  = 3,??2 4  = 15,??2 5  = 17;??3 1  = 4,??3 3  =
10,??3 4  = 14;??4 2  = 9,??4 3  = 18,??4 5  = 19 and ??′ 6  = 1,??′ 7  = 6,??′ 9  =
7. For all other edges ? (if the network has them), ?? = 0. In addition, ?? = 0 for all ?. It can 
be verified that “left” is the better choice for player 3, player 1 or player 4 if and only if the 
strategy of player 2, player 3 or player 1, respectively, is also “left”. Therefore, in any 
equilibrium where player 2 plays “left” or “right”, the other players necessarily do the same. 
However, this means that in the former case player 2 can decrease his cost from 10 to 9 by 
(unilaterally) changing his choice to “right”, and in the latter case, he can decrease it from 19 
to 18 by changing to “left”. This proves that an equilibrium does not exist. 
Using arguments similar to those in the proof of Lemma 2, it is now not difficult to prove the 
following. 
Theorem 3. For a two-terminal network 𝐺 that is not made of two or more such networks 
connected in series, the following conditions are equivalent: 
(i)  𝐺 is homeomorphic to a parallel network, or it has at most three routes that do not pass 
through any edge in opposite directions. 
(ii)  An equilibrium exists in very weighted network congestion game on 𝐺 in which all cost 
functions have self effect. 
For networks that do not satisfy condition (i) in Theorem 3, it may be computationally 
difficult to decide whether an equilibrium exists in a given weighted network congestion 
game where all cost functions exhibit self effect. Dunkel and Schulz [‎ 8] showed, in fact, that 
without any assumptions on the network topology this decision problem is NP-complete 
even in the special cases of resource symmetry or only four players.  
The equilibrium existence decision problem is NP-complete even in the case of parallel 
networks if the players also have different cost functions [‎ 8]. Thus, with player-specific 
weights and costs, the network topology is essentially irrelevant to the complexity of 
deciding whether an equilibrium exists. A game of this kind may have no equilibrium even on 
a three-edge parallel network with only three players [‎ 25]. 
4.4  Matroid congestion games 
Every network topology entails a particular set of combinatorial restrictions on the players’ 
strategy sets in all corresponding network congestion games. For example, in every such 
game, different strategies are incomparable in that the set of edges in one strategy is not a 
subset of that in another. The restrictions take an extreme form in the case of parallel 
networks, which correspond to singleton congestion games. This observation leads to the 
question of whether the existence of equilibrium in this and similar classes of network 
congestion games can be linked directly to the combinatorial structure of a player’s strategy 
space, rather than to the network topology that gives rise to that structure. Specifically, 
Ackermann et al. [‎ 2] presented the following combinatorial version of the equilibrium 
existence problem: What is the most general combinatorial structure for which an 22 
equilibrium is guaranteed to exist in every corresponding weighted congestion game with 
mandatory self effect, and what is that structure for player-specific costs?  
As Ackermann et al. [‎ 2] showed, the most general games of both kinds are matroid 
congestion games, in which the strategy space of each player consists of the bases of a 
matroid on the set of resources. These games and singleton congestion games share the 
property (which reflects the corresponding property of bases of a matroid) that all strategies 
of a player include the same number of resources. However, they allow for much more 
varied and elaborate combinatorial structures, for example, strategy sets that consist of all 
pairs of resources. A noteworthy aspect of the results of Ackermann et al. is that they do not 
take into account how the strategy spaces of different players interweave. This means that 
the existence of equilibrium in weighted congestion games with mandatory self effect and in 
games with player-specific costs may be guaranteed even if some (or all) of the players have 
strategy spaces that do not consist of the bases of a matroid (for example, if some strategies 
of a player include fewer edges than others). The results only entails that, with such strategy 
sets, it is possible to systematically substitute a different edge for each allowable edge for 
each player, such that with the modified strategy sets the existence of equilibrium is not 
guaranteed.  
The positive part of the solution to the combinatorial equilibrium existence problem does 
apply to network congestion games [‎ 2]. However, its usefulness for the graph-theoretic 
version studied in this paper is limited. This assertion is based on the following fact.  
Proposition 5. In a network congestion game on a two-terminal network 𝐺, the strategy set 
of a player ? consists of the bases of a matroid on the set of edges if and only if the sub-
network of 𝐺 that includes only ?’s allowable edges is parallel or is made of several parallel 
networks connected in series. 
Proof. It suffices to show that the first condition (the matroid property) is equivalent to the 
following graph theoretic one: all allowable routes for ? have the exact same vertices and 
pass them in the same order. Since different routes have incomparable sets of edges, these 
sets of edges are the bases of a matroid if and only if they satisfy the bijective exchange 
axiom [40]: there is a one-to-one correspondence between the sets of edges in any pair of 
allowable routes, such that replacing any edge ? in one route with the corresponding edge 
?′ in the other route gives a third (or the same) route. Clearly, the corresponding edges ? 
and ?′ must have the same end vertices. Therefore, the bijective exchange axiom is 
equivalent to the above graph theoretic condition.  ∎  
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